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BYPASSING UKRAINE 
Indeed, this new reality would significantly alter 
a big chunk of Russia’s gas delivery routes by 
making Turkey its main transit country for gas 
deliveries to Europe in an effort to completely 
bypass Ukraine. Hence, with the current transit 
agreements with Ukraine’s state-owned gas 
company Naftogaz ending in 2019, the possible 
redirection of Russia’s gas flow would lead 
certain EU countries that are highly dependent 
on Russian gas – Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic all depend on Russia for more than 
80% of their gas supplies – to reach an impasse 
in terms of gas security around that time. 
Indeed, according to Gazprom’s new plans, the 
European Transmission system operators 
(TSO’s) would have to build the needed 
infrastructure to link their grids to Gazprom’s 
new Turkish-Greek border hub by 2019. The 
construction of this new infrastructure would 
not only cost billions but would also have to 
start right now in order to be achieved by 2019. 
Yet, for now, this scenario remains uncertain as 
it faces realities that play both in its favour and 
in its disfavour. Moreover, if this scenario was to 
become reality, it would be improbable for 
Europe’s countries to sit back and watch. Those 
countries would then rather be looking at 
various options to face the scenario. 
WHY TURKISH STREAM IS PROBABLY 
HAPPENING 
Recently, various technical details were disclosed 
by Alexei Miller during a meeting with Turkish 
Energy minister Taner Yildiz. From the 
pipeline’s four threads combined and planned 
capacity of 63 bcm, 15, 75 bcm will go the 
Turkish grid and 47, 25 bcm to the European 
“A first assessment is that this would 
not work”, EC Vice-President in charge 
of Energy Union Mr. Maros Sefcovic 
said in an interview with The Wall 
Street Journal at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos on the 22nd of January. 
He was commenting on the recent 
announcement by President Vladimir 
Putin and Gazprom’s Alexei Miller. 
Indeed, the Russian gas giant’s CEO 
announced that South Stream would be 
replaced by a new project, Turkish 
Stream, linking Russia to the European 
part of Turkey and this in addition to 
the existing 16 billion cubic meters 
(bcm) Blue stream.  
This policy brief looks at the various 
implications this new reality could have 
for Europe’s energy security. 
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market through the new Turkish-Greek border 
facility. The official agreement on the pipeline is 
planned for the second quarter of 2015, but no 
contract has been signed yet. The first thread of 
the project could be active and delivering gas to 
the Turkish market starting in 2017-2018. 
Furthermore, at least five main incentives are 
pushing Russia towards finalizing the project, 
including: the Third Energy Package (EU energy 
rules, notably including an ownership 
unbundling clause), avoiding loss of already 
engaged work, the financial benefit, keeping its 
geopolitical influence in Europe and avoid 
losing face in its current stand-off with the 
West. 
Denounced as the main reason why Russia had 
to abandon the South Stream project, the Third 
Energy Package rules remain and this reality has 
given Moscow impetus to pursuing the new 
Gazprom plans. The Europeans are not likely to 
give way on the various implications of the 
Third Energy Package either, so any Russian 
temptation at pressuring the EU further on that 
would be counterproductive. The EU can’t 
afford to bury its energy laws if it is to achieve 
its single energy market. On the Russian side, 
the emergence of a new willingness to follow the 
Third Package rules is also highly improbable. 
For Gazprom then, the prospect of building 
new pipelines on EU ground is becoming a 
liability, hence its new plan to limit its 
infrastructure to the Greek-Turkish border. 
Indeed, Russia’s traditional energy model in 
Europe, controlling transport routes from point 
of extraction to point of final consumption is 
more and more constrained. 
Another incentive is for Russia to avoid any 
losses in already disbursed cash and investments 
in the run up to the South Stream construction 
work. Indeed, most of the purchased pipes, the 
feasibility studies for the undersea part of the 
project and the technical capacities (pipe-laying 
vessels) will be used in the Turkish Stream 
project. 
On the financial side, abandoning South Stream 
makes sense. Indeed, South Stream was planned 
in a period of high oil prices. The current state 
of Russia’s ailing economy with the West’s 
imposed sanctions over the situation in Ukraine 
and the fall of oil prices has led to a ruble crash. 
This new economic reality would have made it 
quite difficult for Gazprom to invest in such a 
costly (about 40 billion USD) infrastructure as 
South Stream, hence the decision to drop the 
project. That being said, the new Turkish Stream 
pipeline might turn out to be expensive as well. 
Furthermore, by building this new pipeline, 
Russia would make it possible for its gas 
deliveries to Europe to completely bypass 
Ukraine (about 60 bcm through the 
Brotherhood and Soyuz pipelines), with which it 
is in a de facto state of war, and still maintain its 
dominant position in the European market 
accounting for a third of EU’s needs, with 
around 140 bcm a year. This would strengthen 
Europe’s dependence on Russian gas as well as 
increase Russia’s geopolitical relevance in 
Europe. 
Lastly, in the wake of Russia’s political standoff 
with the West in the Ukraine crisis, President 
Putin can’t be seen as losing face. With this new 
energy deal with Turkey, Russia is showing it is 
independent, not as isolated as the west pretends 
and remains capable of high investment 
infrastructure projects, sanctions or not. 
WHY IT’S GOING TO BE DIFFICULT 
For various reasons, Russia’s new pipeline 
project, Turkish Stream, might turn out to be 
too complicated to develop. First, the EU 
remains Russia’s top gas customer. Indeed, even 
though Russia and China recently announced 
important gas deals (in May and November 
2014) and the development of the Power of 
Siberia pipeline, China is unlikely to replace 
Europe as Russia’s top customer in the short to 
medium term. With a maximum 68 bcm per year 
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planned export capacity by 2020, Russian supply 
to China, amounting then for about 1,7 % of 
China’s energy demand, would still suffer by 
comparison to Europe’s yearly 140 bcm 
demand. In addition, the negotiation with China 
on price will be tough and due to the current 
low gas prices, the Chinese might end up paying 
less than the Europeans do. Thus it is hard to 
imagine a wise seller toying with his prime buyer 
for too long without taking the risk of eventually 
alienating him for good, this being especially 
true when the buyer is already cautious, “once 
burnt, twice shy” as the saying goes. Can 
Gazprom really afford to lose its main market 
and two-thirds of its cash revenues?  
Besides, numerous long term contracts signed 
between Gazprom and certain European energy 
companies go well beyond 2019. These 
contracts are usually quite specific about the 
point of delivery (currently through Ukraine). 
Thus breaking these contracts wouldn’t come 
cheap as it would result in Gazprom facing 
important penalties. In order to avoid such 
penalties, Gazprom would have to convince the 
European companies and Transmission System 
Operators (TSO’s) to agree to both a contract 
modification and a huge investment on their 
part to build the new infrastructure linking their 
grid to the Turkish-Greek gas hub by 2019. The 
only way to convince them would then probably 
be to offer substantial discounts on delivery 
prices. So the question is, will the European 
companies play along when they know they will 
have to invest massively and won’t be supported 
by an irritated European Commission in face of 
Gazprom’s “fait accompli”? Indeed, those 
investments could well be redirected towards 
other EU supported projects that wouldn’t 
reinforce Russia’s energy grip on the EU, as the 
Southern Gas Corridor, for example. The EU 
would surely be looking for more reliable energy 
sources, where it wouldn’t have to face the 2006 
and 2009 winter crisis kind of scenario. 
Moreover, Turkish Stream looks like a costly 
infrastructure when the European demand is 
weakening and the EU is actively working on 
the diversification of its supply sources, meaning 
new competition for Russian gas. Gazprom’s 
plans to bypass Ukraine’s existing grid to switch 
to a new yet to-be-built route to supply Europe 
thus makes little sense economically. Indeed, 
Russia abandoned South Stream’s construction 
because, at least partly, it was becoming too 
pricy within the current economic conditions. 
Yet, at least, Gazprom was part of a consortium 
with ENI, EDF and Wintershall in South 
Stream’s construction process. By contrast, the 
Russian company will have to build the whole 
undersea infrastructure of Turkish Stream on its 
own and will only be sharing the cost of the 
project’s onshore infrastructure with the Turkish 
company Botas but investors, Russians as well 
as Turkish might be hard to find given the 
current economic environment. Hence the new 
project could turn out to be as expensive as 
South Stream. 
The appropriateness of this huge investment 
could be further challenged by the EU’s future 
renewed efforts to reduce its dependence on 
Russian gas by reducing demand, increasing its 
energy efficiency and actively looking for 
alternative energy sources (renewables, 
unconventional resources) and alternative gas 
sources. Adding to this, the recent mild winters 
and more importantly the economic crisis 
impact on EU’s economy, have seen EU’s 
Russian gas imports slowing continually since 
2010, thus weakening Russia’s position in the 
European market. In this context one wonders 
if the European demand for 47 bcm really 
exists? Of course this reality must be nuanced by 
the IEA’s latest EU energy policy review stating 
the EU’s expected gas imports increase between 
2020 and 2030 and thus its renewed dependence 
on Russian pipeline gas imports for the 
foreseeable future. 
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Finally, the European Commission is getting 
ready to proceed with its antitrust case against 
Gazprom that was launched in September 
2012.1 The case, based on the Russian Energy 
Giant’s presumed abuse of its dominant position 
in Europe’s natural gas market, could further 
weaken the company’s position in Europe as 
well as its finances. Indeed, it could, if the 
allegations are upheld, be facing important fines, 
mandatory restructuring of its European 
activities and even mandatory sales of capacities 
to competitors. In such a scenario, Gazprom 
could be forced to change the way it is doing 
business in the EU. 
GEOPOLITICS AT PLAY 
The potential gain for Russia is quite obvious. 
Indeed through Turkish Stream, Putin is looking 
at achieving three main goals: reinforcing EU’s 
dependence on Russian gas by developing a new 
delivery route, making Ukraine irrelevant when 
it comes to gas transit and strengthening 
Russia’s control over the Turkish market. 
Russia’s energy policy is directly linked to its 
grand strategy. Having understood that the EU 
won’t loosen its Third Energy Package’s rules, 
Russia and Gazprom will leave it to the 
Europeans to build the necessary infrastructure 
to link the European market to the new Turkish 
Stream. To do so, Russia is employing a divide 
and rule strategy, taking advantage of the 
diverging member state’s views. In fact, it is 
counting on a “coalition of the willing” 
consisting of those European countries showing 
a pro-Russian stance such as Alexis Tsipras’ 
Greece, Orban’s Hungary but also Macedonia 
and Serbia.  All of them have been cozying up to 
President Putin as witnessed by recent state 
visits and diplomatic gestures. To enhance its 
relations with these countries, Russia is offering 
price discounts on oil and gas deliveries but is 
also providing financial help in the case of 
Greece. If Russia’s efforts are successful, then, 
these countries would likely be instrumental in 
building new infrastructure linking Turkish 
Stream to the European market. This project 
could also serve as a Russian retaliation towards 
the reluctant EU member states it is blaming in 
the South Stream cancellation, especially 
Bulgaria. Moscow has a long history of 
threatening the eventual objectors with 
increasing gas prices. In order to avoid being left 
aside, Bulgaria is now actively lobbying in favour 
of the Turkish Stream alternative, namely the 
Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its 
possible European extensions, including the 
currently shelved Nabucco West pipeline and 
the 5 bcm Greek-Bulgarian interconnector 
(IGB). The prospect for all these potential 
transit countries is to benefit from important 
transit fees as well as gaining in geopolitical 
relevance. It is interesting to see how Russia is 
also taking advantage of Europe’s open market 
reality by confronting it with its monopolistic 
state-owned groups. However, it remains unsure 
what project the EU and the European energy 
companies will support.  
With Turkish Stream, Russia will also be able to 
strengthen its control over the growing Turkish 
market. Indeed, it will add a new route to the 
already existing ones (Blue Stream, Tans-Balkan 
Pipeline) and link its resources to new hubs in 
Turkey. It will also geopolitically bring Ankara 
closer and strengthen its influence in the region. 
Nonetheless, arm-twisting Turkey will be much 
harder than arm-twisting Ukraine in case of 
disputes over gas transit, or with respect to 
other political issues. Russia won’t be able to 
play the game it used to play in Ukraine. 
For Europe though, supporting the Turkish 
Stream project could be counterproductive in 
terms of diversification and even strengthen its 
current dependence on Russia. Indeed, Turkish 
Stream would only add a new route for Russian 
gas to access the European market. Moreover, 
Russia would still be able to control the volumes 
reaching Europe. Adding to this, the project 
might compete with the TANAP project.  Both 
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of them are supposed to transit through Turkey 
and become operational around 2020. Turkish 
Stream might thus hurt the TANAP project by 
reinforcing the sentiment of uncertainty and 
instability surrounding these huge gas 
infrastructure investments. Furthermore, if 
TANAP and its general framework the Southern 
Gas Corridor project were to be completed as 
planned, they could truly help Europe’s need for 
diversification as well as undermine Russia’s 
interests, be they geopolitical or economic. This 
explains why we might witness an actual race 
between the projects. 
The EU will also have to manage the rising 
tensions between its member states and try to 
convince them to stay united on the energy 
front. This, as witnessed already with Hungary’s 
latest comments and the first signs of division 
concerning the Energy Union, might turn out to 
be quite complex. 
Turkey defends its pragmatic approach and 
pledges to accept all pipelines that want to cross 
its territory. Indeed, the country would happily 
see itself developing as a regional energy hub 
even though it might actually rather develop as a 
regional transit country if it doesn’t negotiate the 
contracts well. Currently it is letting both the EU 
and Russia advance their pawns in their 
respective pipeline projects. The EU’s Southern 
Gas Corridor project transporting gas from the 
Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II fields) 
and eventually Central Asia and the Middle-East 
to Europe and Russia’s Turkish Stream creating 
a new route towards the Turkish and European 
markets. Even if Turkey is reluctant in openly 
acknowledging the existing competition between 
the two projects, it remains uncertain if both of 
the projects will be supported in the same way 
by Ankara.  
For now, Turkey has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with Russia but no legally 
binding contract yet and the latest comments by 
the Turkish authorities put the beginning of 
construction at the end of 2017. By contrast, the 
TANAP project is based on a binding 
intergovernmental agreement signed by both 
Azeri President Aliyev and Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan on 26 June 2012. On 16 
March 2015, the opening ceremony marking the 
start of TANAP’s construction works was 
attended by EC Vice-President in charge of 
Energy Union Sefcovic, Azeri President Aliyev 
and Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz. 
Furthermore, Turkey is part of the consortium 
managing the Shah Deniz II oil and gas fields 
that will be supplying TANAP. 
Because of all these elements, Turkey is 
generally seen as the main winner in any 
scenario. Both with TANAP and Turkish 
Stream it gains leverage on the EU as well as on 
Russia. It might use this new political clout to 
constrain Russia’s grand regional strategy and 
gain weight in its EU membership negotiations. 
But Turkey might also deepen its dependence 
on Russian gas by building Turkish Stream. 
Indeed, the country already imports more than 
half of its gas from Russia, thus adding a new 
Russian route to the already existing ones is 
almost certain to increase this dependency. 
Ukraine, on the one hand, could be losing its 
geopolitical relevance with the new Turkish 
Stream project. Indeed, if it was to be bypassed 
completely, it would first, lose its transit 
revenues and second, lose its political status as 
the main energy link between Russia and the 
EU. On the other hand, the country could, by 
losing its transit role, become less dependent on 
Russia and may have the opportunity of 
engaging in the needed political reforms with 
less outside interference. 
WHAT CAN THE EU DO? 
The EU is at a crossroads. Now is the time to 
take important decisions that will have lasting 
implications for the European energy market. 
The Juncker Commission has understood this, 
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hence the development of the Energy Union 
and the launch of talks focusing on Energy 
Diplomacy at the EEAS. The Energy Union’s 
plan, unveiled on 25 February, will aim at 
bringing greater energy security, sustainability 
and competitiveness to the European Energy 
market. This plan puts forward actions focusing 
on : energy security and solidarity; the full 
integration of the European market; a renewed 
effort on energy efficiency; progress in the 
decarbonisation of the economy; improving 
energy management and governance; further 
investments in R&D and competitiveness.  
Developing the Energy Union and making sure 
the 2030 framework for climate and energy 
policy targets are fully implemented, could be 
one solution for the EU to lessen its 
dependence on Russian gas. By pushing for 
diversification but also interconnecting the 
national grids, developing reverse flows 
capacities, developing more storage facilities, 
building new LNG terminals, reducing energy 
consumption in general with more efficiency, 
expanding the deployment of renewable energy 
technologies and unconventional oil and gas 
resources, the various EU member states could 
find themselves in a more comfortable position 
when it comes to energy security. Of course it’s 
not going to be easy for all the MS to move in 
the same direction together; it is going to be a 
long-haul project. 
Nevertheless, we will here focus on gas. Russia’s 
gas is probably going to stay important in 
Europe’s energy mix but for the various reasons 
previously developed in this article, Europe 
might still be willing to diversify its supply 
sources. To do so the Commission has put 
forward various solutions in its Energy Union 
Package2, its European Energy Security Strategy3 
and in the list of the recognized projects of 
common interest4 benefiting from the 
Connecting Europe Facility financing scheme. 
First, Europe should develop its conventional 
gas resources, the current production areas 
should be further exploited while the new 
potentially producing areas should be explored. 
Indeed, as it becomes increasingly recognized 
that British, Norwegian and Dutch production is 
in decline, the Eastern-Mediterranean area 
(Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Palestine) could 
become Europe’s next energy production hot-
spot. Simultaneously, EU’s MS should try to 
assess their unconventional gas (shale gas) 
resources potential that could be limiting the 
impact of Europe’s declining conventional 
resources. Indeed, in British Petroleum’s (BP) 
last Energy outlook, the company expects that 
by 2035 two-thirds of Europe’s natural gas will 
have to be imported. 
The other solution is for the EU to find new 
supplying partners. Through its various 
documents, the EC has highlighted key 
infrastructure projects to link Europe to the 
relevant areas when it comes to gas 
diversification. On top of the list is the Southern 
Gas Corridor that would link Europe to the 
Caspian Sea region. This massive project is 
based on the development of three pipelines: the 
Southern Caucasus pipeline (SCP), the Trans-
Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and 
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). This set of 
pipelines will connect Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz 
II gas fields to the European market in the short 
term. In the medium to long term, it could be 
expanded and be connected to other producers 
as in the Eastern Mediterranean region, 
Turkmenistan, Iraq, the Kurdistan region and 
even Iran. The Southern Caucasus Pipeline (also 
called BTE) will be connecting Baku 
(Azerbaijan) to Erzurum (Turkey) via Tbilisi 
(Georgia) and will have a 25 bcm capacity. The 
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) 
will link Erzurum to the Turkish-Greek border 
and will transport 16 bcm (and up to 60 bcm in 
2030). This pipeline will then connect with the 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that will deliver 
around 20 bcm capacity and link Kipoi (Greece) 
to Lecce (Italy) via Fier (Albania). Additional 
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infrastructure could further be connected to this 
web to link other parts of Europe (notably the 
Balkans) with the 5 bcm Greek-Bulgarian 
interconnector (IGB), the 15 bcm Turkey-
Greece-Italy interconnector (ITGI) or even the 
30 bcm Nabucco West piepeline project that 
could eventually be revived and link Greece to 
Austria (Baumgarten) via Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary. 
Azerbaijan’s first deliveries to Europe could take 
place as soon as 2018. The project will start with 
only 10 bcm, but could then be expanded in 
order to reach to up to 60 bcm around 2030. 
Turkmenistan could also supply Europe by 
connecting itself to the TANAP pipeline with 
the 30 bcm planned undersea Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline (TCP) that would be connecting 
Turkmenbasy’s fields (Turkmenistan) and 
eventually Tengiz’s fields (Kazakhstan) to Baku 
(Azerbaijan). Both Azrbaijan and Turkmenistan 
look like serious alternative supply sources with 
respectively some 0.9 trillion cubic meters and 
17.5 tcm. Azerbaijan’s close political proximity 
to Turkey convinced it to pursue the long haul 
project of supplying Europe. For Turkmenistan, 
things might be a bit more complicated even 
though Azeris and Turkmens concluded an 
agreement on the future construction of the 
Trans Caspian Pipeline in 2014. Firstly, due to 
the disputed legal status of the Caspian Sea, 
Russia, Iran and Kazakhstan could try to block 
any progress in the development of the TCP 
pipeline. Indeed, Russia and Iran would 
eventually suffer from Ashgabat’s rivalry in 
supplying the EU gas market in the future. 
Secondly, the EU could be competing with 
other actors, namely China, Pakistan and India. 
Turkmenistan has been ramping up its energy 
ties to China in the last years as China is willing 
to invest in Turkmenistan’s natural gas 
production capacities. Furthermore, the Central 
Asia–China gas pipeline (completed in 2009) has 
a 55 bcm capacity that could be expanded in the 
future. Indeed, even though China’s recent 30 
bcm Power of Siberia Pipeline deal with Russia 
(May 2014) might be pushing Turkmenistan to 
look for new markets, Turkmenistan still 
remains China’s largest gas supply source. 
Moreover, the 28 bcm planned Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) 
could add another project competing for the 
same gas even if the project is not showing 
much progress since the 2010 intergovernmental 
agreement was signed in Ashgabat (due to the 
significant conflict ongoing). 
The Southern Gas Corridor could also help 
linking Europe to Middle - Eastern gas 
suppliers. The two main regional players could 
be Iran and Iraq. Indeed, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran deserves more attention with the nuclear 
non-proliferation deal making serious progress. 
Of course, it remains uncertain whether the 
negotiations will succeed but western energy 
companies are already being courted by the 
Iranians. Iran is home to the second largest gas 
reserves after Russia. It could therefore be seen 
as a potential alternative to Russian gas, but one 
must take into account the following realities. 
Iran’s gas field infrastructure is ageing, it thus 
would take both time and heavy investments to 
modernize it and the speed at which the EU, the 
US and the UN sanctions would potentially be 
lifted would be another factor to account for. 
Moreover, Iran’s high domestic demand leads 
most of its production to actually be consumed 
internally. Finally, the EU would be competing 
with others on the client list, namely Pakistan, 
Oman and Turkey with whom Iran already 
shares pipelines. For all these reasons, if Iran 
could export gas to Europe, it would only be 
around 2030 at best, leaving it to others to 
supply the European market in the meantime. In 
the long term though, Iran could turn out to be 
a game changer in the gas world.  
The second regional key player is Iraq. Home to 
3.6 tcm, the country could also help enhance 
Europe’s energy security. Of course for Iraq, the 
necessary political stability, security and 
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economic conditions are far from existing. For it 
to develop the necessary infrastructure to supply 
the European market, the country must first 
tackle the significant internal political and 
security problems it faces. Most importantly, it 
will need to significantly degrade ISIS and regain 
control of large parts of Iraqi territory that were 
captured in the last year. The same goes for the 
Kurdistan region even if various major energy 
firms are already present on the ground and 
working on developing the gas production 
capacities. 
The other region that could be part of the 
Southern Gas Corridor supply is the East 
Mediterranean (East Med). Indeed, the East 
Med is home to large offshore gas reserves. 
Since 2009, the discovered reserves in Israel, the 
Republic of Cyprus and Lebanon amount to 
about 3.5 tcm. These countries have the 
potential of exporting more than 10 bcm within 
a 30 year timeframe. Unfortunately progress has 
been rather slow. This can be explained by 
multiple obstacles. On the political front, the 
long standing issues between Cyprus and Turkey 
still poison the overall negotiations and 
especially with the legal disputes concerning land 
and maritime borders. Another issue is the 
absence of transport infrastructure. The 
construction of pipelines or LNG plants will 
necessitate heavy investments. The interested 
investors are also facing regulatory and 
bureaucratic hurdles that are slowing any 
attempt at moving forward. This in turn makes 
it impossible for the exploiting companies to 
develop the discovered gas fields. Thus, for 
now, the necessary regulatory and political 
stability conditions for a better exploitation of 
the hydrocarbon resources are not fulfilled. If 
the local national authorities were to find 
political solutions, the region’s resources could 
then be contributing to Europe’s energy 
security. 
Next to the Southern Gas Corridor, there’s 
another region that is explicitly named in the 
various EU external energy policy publications: 
North Africa. The main issues for the region are 
political stability and security. The impact of the 
weak regional stability imperils the hydrocarbon 
industry’s need for investments. The region 
which is already heavily connected to Spain and 
Italy, could theoretically easily increase its 
exports towards the European market. Indeed, 
the 12 bcm Maghreb-Europe pipeline linking 
Algeria to Spain via Morocco, the 10 bcm Galsi 
pipeline linking Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and 
Sardinia, the 8 bcm Medgaz pipeline linking 
Algeria to Spain, the 30 bcm Trans-
Mediterranean pipeline linking Algeria to Italy 
via Tunisia and Sicily and the 11 bcm 
Greenstream pipeline linking Libya to Italy are 
currently underexploited. A good example of the 
different hurdles encountered on the ground can 
be found in Algeria. The country holds about 
4.5 tcm of gas. Unfortunately, the conjunction 
of an increasing domestic consumption, a 
stagnant if not slowing production, a strong 
public opposition to new drillings especially for 
unconventional resources and alarming security 
issues linked to the presence of armed Islamic 
extremist groups make it quite difficult for any 
investors to be attracted to the country. A 
further issue is Spain’s poor interconnection 
with France thus making it difficult for North 
African gas to reach the rest of Europe by pipes. 
This problem could be faced by investing in 
additional interconnectors along the Spanish-
French border. Hence Algeria’s national 
hydrocarbon industry suffers and remains 
underexploited. The same could be said for 
Libya where the security situation appears to be 
even worse. If the region was to stabilize 
politically and in terms of security, it could very 
well become one of Europe’s top suppliers 
when it comes to gas. 
Finally, LNG capacities could also be part of the 
answer in Europe’s gas security. Various 
international suppliers are available on the 
market. Of course, the gas prices might turn out 
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to be more expensive because Europe would 
find itself in competition with other markets and 
notably the Asian one. For Europe to be able to 
better profit from these sources, it has to better 
use its already existing capacities as well as 
develop new LNG facilities as advised by the 
European Commission in multiple documents. 
Only then could it have an easier access to LNG 
supplies from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the USA and 
Canada. In order to tackle this issue, the 
European Commission is currently working on a 
comprehensive LNG strategy as announced in 
its Energy Union Package. 
EUROPE SHOULD STICK TO ITS GUNS 
As explored throughout this article, Russia’s new 
pipeline project, Turkish Stream, might have 
important implications for Europe’s energy 
security. Indeed, this bold move by Gazprom, 
Europe’s prime gas supplier puts Europe at a 
crossroads. Now is the time for Europe to 
decide where it wants to go, what it wants to do, 
where it wants to do it, how it wants to do it and 
with whom. Europe can either follow the course 
it has been on for decades or it can decide to 
take a new road. This new road would stretch 
towards energy independence by taking on 
diversification plans. Russia, as Europe’s main 
gas supplier and big neighbour will obviously 
stay an important actor in Europe’s energy 
consumption for better or worse. But this reality 
shouldn’t stop Europe from diversifying its 
energy sources. On the contrary Europe should 
stick to its guns. It should implement its various 
infrastructure projects, such as the Southern Gas 
Corridor, and not allow for Russian tactics to 
transform its projects in further Nabucco 
scenario repetitions. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 See official press release:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm?locale=en  
2 See official document: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-
01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF  
3 See official document:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN  
4 See official document: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_pci_projects_country_0.pdf 
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